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TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE
by
Ernest E. Figari,Jr.,*
Thomas A. Graves,** and A. Erin Dwyer***

TtHE
major developments in the field of civil procedure during the Survey period occurred through judicial decisions and promulgation

of

the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.I
I.

JURISDICTION OF THE SUBJECT MATTER

During the Survey period many appellate decisions scrutinized the power
of a trial court to enjoin the prosecution of a competing action filed in another jurisdiction. In Gannon v. Payne2 the Texas Supreme Court faced an
international tug-of-war in which the plaintiff, a Texas resident, had filed
suit seeking damages for alleged fraud from a Canadian resident. After entering a general appearance, the defendant initiated a competing action in
Canada against the plaintiff. The plaintiff countered with a request in the
Texas court to temporarily enjoin the defendant from prosecution of the Canadian action. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court granted the
request. On appeal the defendant challenged the power of the trial court to
halt the Canadian action. Noting that the question was one of first impression in Texas, the court dissolved the injunction, emphasizing that "[r]espect
for the principle of comity compels led [the conclusion] .

.

. that the trial

court abused its discretion in granting the temporary injunction. '' 3
Although the trial court had the power to restrain the prosecution of the
competing action, the supreme court reasoned that, "[o]nly in exceptional
situations should a trial court issue an injunction prohibiting a foreign citi* B.S., Texas A & M University; LL.B., University of Texas; LL.M., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
** B.B.A., New Mexico State University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
*** B.A., University of Notre Dame; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Dallas,
Texas.
1. The adoption of the new Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure became effective September 1, 1986. See PromulgatingNew Rules ofAppellate Procedure,49 TEX. B.J. 556 (1986).
Subsequently, two additional rules of appellate procedure were added, and they became effective January 1, 1987. See Order of the Supreme Court of Texas Promulgating Two New Rules
of Appellate Procedure, 49 TEX. B.J. 1008 (1986).
2. 706 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. 1986). See generally Figari, Graves & Dwyer, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 40 Sw. L.J. 491, 492 (1986) [hereinafter Figari, 1986
Annual Survey] (discussing court of appeals opinion).
3. 706 S.W.2d at 308.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41

zen from prosecuting an action in his home country."'4
The Texas Supreme Court confronted an analogous question in Christensen v. Integrity Insurance Co.5 In Christensen the trial court temporarily
enjoined the prosecution of a competing action filed in a sister state. The
court acknowledged that the trial court had the power to issue the injunction, but cautioned that "[t]he principle of comity ... requires that courts
exercise this equitable power sparingly, and only in very special circumstances. ' '6 After holding that "[a] party seeking to enjoin an out-of-state
lawsuit must show that a clear equity demands the Texas court's intervention,"'7 the court dissolved the injunction because the required showing had
8
not been made.
II.

JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON

The propriety of out-of-state service under now recodified article 203 lb, 9
the Texas long-arm statute, continues to be the subject of judicial attention.
Section 3 of article 203 1b authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident when the nonresident is doing business in Texas. 10 Doing business
includes "entering into contract by mail or otherwise" with a Texas resident
when either party is to perform the contract in whole or part in Texas."1
Micromedia v. Automated Broadcast Controls,'2 a recent decision of the
Fifth Circuit sustaining nonresident service under article 2031b, reiterates
that "[e]ven a single purposeful contact may be sufficient to meet the requirements of minimum contacts when the cause of action arises from the
contact."13
The plaintiff, a partnership of Texas citizens formed for the purpose of
establishing and operating a radio station in Texas, sued a Maryland corporation headquartered in that state, to recover damages for breach of contract. The plaintiff dealt through a third party representative and purchased
from the defendant radio broadcast equipment that was in the design stage.
After several telephone conversations between the buyer and seller the plaintiff agreed to use certain interim equipment to be supplied by the defendant
until the final equipment could be completed and shipped. The interim
equipment was subsequently shipped to the plaintiff in Texas. Problems
arose with the operation of the equipment, and the plaintiff refused to pay
for it. In response the defendant refused to ship the final equipment when it
became ready. The plaintiff then filed suit in Texas. Service was effected
4. Id.
5.

719 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. 1986).

6. Id. at 163.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 164.
9. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 203 lb (Vernon 1964), amended by Act of May 17,
1979, ch. 245, § 1, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 522, 522-23, recodified as TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. §§ 17.042-.045 (Vernon 1986).
10. Id. § 3, recodified as TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.044 (Vernon 1986).
11. Id. § 4, recodified as TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (Vernon 1986).
12. 799 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1986).
13. Id. at 234.
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under article 203 lb, and the defendant responded with a motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court sustained service and, following a trial, entered judgment against the defendant. On appeal the Fifth
Circuit affirmed, holding that the defendant's contacts were sufficient for the
14
assertion of personal jurisdiction with respect to the contract claim.
A recent decision of the Texas Supreme Court, CapitolBrick Inc. v. Fleming Manufacturing Co.,1 5 considered whether article 2031b requires that
process be personally served on the secretary of state himself, rather than on
a subordinate. The plaintiff sued a nonresident corporation for breach of
warranty and sought to effect service under article 2031b by having a constable deliver process to an employee in the office of the secretary of state.
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a certificate prepared by the secretary of state
showing that the secretary had received process and had forwarded it to the
defendant. The trial court granted a default judgment on the basis of the
service after the defendant failed to appear. The defendant challenged the
service by writ of error, and the court of appeals held that article 2031b
requires personal service on the secretary of state.' 6 The Texas Supreme
Court reversed.17 The court concluded that, in the absence of fraud or mistake, the certificate was "conclusive evidence" that service of process was
received by the secretary of state for the defendant.' 8 Thus, the court reinstated the default judgment, holding that the trial court properly asserted
personal jurisdiction.' 9 Although Capitol Brick does not state that article
203 lb permits service to be made on a subordinate of the secretary of state,
the case suggests that filing the appropriate certificate will in most circumstances render such service effective.
The opinion in Colwell Realty Investments, Inc. v. Triple T Inns of Arizona, Inc.20 is a virtual procedural guidebook to the problems facing a plaintiff seeking to invoke article 2031b in federal court. The court concluded
that, contrary to the rule under state law, 21 the plaintiff in a federal court
bears the burden of proving that the nonresident defendant is amenable to
process under the long-arm statute. 22 A plaintiff is not required, however, to
prove a defendant's amenability to process under the forum's jurisdictional
statute by a preponderance of the evidence. Rather, a plaintiff meets the
burden in federal court by merely making a prima facie showing of the mini14. Id.
15. 722 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. 1986).
16. 703 S.W.2d 365, 366-67 (Tex. App.-Austin), rev'd, 722 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. 1986).
17. 722 S.W.2d at 402.
18. Id. at 401.
19. Id. at 401-02.
20. 785 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1986).
21. See, e.g., Siskind v. Villa Found. for Educ., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex. 1982);
Otis Elevator Co. v. Zac Smith & Co., 715 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no
writ); Strick Corp. v. Keen, 709 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no
writ).
22. 785 F.2d at 1332; accord Jetco Elec. Indus. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1232 (5th Cir.
1973); Tetco Metal Prods., Inc. v. Langham, 387 F.2d 721, 723 (5th Cir. 1968).
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mum contacts necessary to support jurisdiction. 23
Colwell is also informative as to the circumstances under which a plaintiff
may rely solely on pleadings, rather than supporting affidavits, depositions,
or other recognized methods of discovery, to satisfy the jurisdictional burden. According to the court, allegations in the complaint will be taken as
24
true, except to the extent they are controverted by opposing affidavits.
Thus, unless the nonresident defendant concludes that the plaintiff's pleadings are lacking in necessary respects, the defendant is well advised to submit
proof supportive of his jurisdictional position.
III.

SPECIAL APPEARANCE

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120a governs special appearances to challenge personal jurisdiction in state court. Rule 120a requires a party making
a special appearance to have the appearance heard prior to any other plea or
motion. 25 A dilemma arises when counsel is asked to represent a nonresident defendant against whom a default judgment has been taken and the
defendant does not appear to be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the
forum. The court may rule that counsel's action amounts to a general appearance if counsel files a special appearance followed by a motion for new
trial. 26 The defendant is then obliged to defend the suit in Texas if the motion for new trial is acted upon and the default judgment set aside. 27 During
the Survey period one resourceful counsel appears to have found a way to
avoid this problem.
In Myers v. Emery28 the trial court entered a default judgment because the
time within which the defendants had to file an answer expired after nonresident service was effected. Two weeks later the defendants filed a special
appearance challenging jurisdiction over their persons. Instead of filing a
motion for new trial, however, counsel for the defendants orally requested a
conference concerning the default judgment with opposing counsel and the
trial judge. At the conference defendants' counsel made an oral request that
the default judgment be set aside, and the trial judge granted the request.
Later, a hearing was held with respect to the special appearance and, after
hearing evidence on the matter, the trial court dismissed the suit for lack of
personal jurisdiction. In a divided decision the court of appeals sustained
the dismissal. 29 Attributing the setting aside of the default judgment to the
trial judge, 30 rather than defendants' counsel, the court concluded that rule
120a "does not preclude a special appearance being made after judgment nor
23. 785 F.2d at 1333; accord Jetco Elec. Indus. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1232 (5th Cir.
1973); O'Hare Int'l Bank v. Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1971).
24. 785 F.2d at 1333; accord Black v. Acme Markets, Inc., 564 F.2d 681, 683 n.3 (5th Cir.

1977).
25. TEx. R. Civ. P. 120a(l).
26. See Liberty Enters. v. Moore Transp. Co., 690 S.W.2d 570, 571-72 (Tex. 1985).
27. Id.
28. 697 S.W.2d 26 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ) (2-1 decision).
29. Id. at 32.
30. Id. at 29.
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does the rule preclude the trial judge from setting aside the default judgment
31
on his own motion."
Barrett v. Barrett 32 follows the lead of earlier decisions3 3 and serves as a
warning that the due order of hearing under rule 120a must be strictly observed in order to avoid a waiver of a defendant's jurisdictional challenge.
34
According to the court in Barrett, rule 120a must be strictly followed.
"[I]f a defendant raises any other issue at the [special appearance] hearing,
such as defective service, venue, defects in plaintiff's petition, or other such
matters, before the court has ruled on the Rule 120a motion, the appearance
35
will be rendered general and will constitute consent to jurisdiction.
Wilson v. Chemco Chemical Co. 36 indicates that a ruling must be obtained
on a special appearance in order for the point to be preserved for appeal.
Although the defendant in Wilson had filed a special appearance, he neither
set the special appearance for hearing nor obtained a ruling on the special
appearance from the trial court. The defendant later attempted to raise lack
of personal jurisdiction as a ground for reversal on appeal. Pointing to the
inaction of the defendant, the appellate court held that "[a] special appear' 37
ance not ruled upon by the trial court presents nothing for review."
IV.

SERVICE OF PROCESS

A number of decisions during the Survey period invalidated service of
process on the basis of inadvertent errors occurring in the course of service.
In City of Mesquite v. Bellingar 38 the defendant was a municipality, and the
plaintiff attempted to effect service by delivering process to the city attorney.
When the defendant city failed to appear, the plaintiff obtained a default
judgment; the city subsequently sought to challenge the service by writ of
error. Relying on article 2028, 3 9 which states that service may be made on a
municipality by delivering process to the "mayor, clerk, secretary or treasurer," the city contended that there was clear noncompliance with the statute. Acknowledging the obvious deficiency in their service, the plaintiffs
countered that article 2028 did not foreclose service on a municipality by
delivering process to one of the unnamed city officials. The court, rejecting
this argument and concluding that the list of persons in the statute was exclusive, set aside the default judgment.4°
31. Id.
32. 715 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, no writ).
33. See, e.g., Liberty Enters. v. Moore Transp. Co., 690 S.W.2d 570, 571-72 (Tex. 1985);
Portland Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Bernstein, 716 S.W.2d 532, 534 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1200, 89 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1986); Butler v. Butler,
577 S.W.2d 501, 507 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ dism'd).
34. 715 S.W.2d at 113.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
711 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
Id. at 266.
701 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2028 (Vernon 1964), recodified as TEX. CIv. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 17.024 (Vernon 1986).
40. 701 S.W.2d at 336.
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A combined oversight by the serving officer and the postal authorities apparently caused the service error at issue in Metcalf v. Taylor.4 1 The plaintiff
sought to obtain service over one defendant by utilizing registered mail as
authorized by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106;42 however, in such an
instance, rule 10743 requires that the officer's return bear the officer's signature, state the manner of service, and, when service is by mail, contain the
return receipt with the addressee's signature. In Metcalf the officer had not
filled out or signed his return, and moreover, the return receipt showed
neither the date of signature nor the purpose for the signature. The court
found this service to be incomplete and thus set aside the default judgment
based on it. 4
Article 2029, authorizing a procedure for serving a corporation, provides
that service may be made "by leaving a copy of the [citation] at the principal
office of the company during office hours."'45 In Maritime Services, Inc. v.
Moller Steamship Co.46 two citations of service had been made on the sole
defendant, a Texas corporation. A default judgment was entered on the basis of such service. The first return recited service on a named individual as
defendant with no mention of the corporation or its offices. The second return recited that service had been made on the corporation by delivering
citation to the same individual as registered agent of the corporation; however, a preprinted line under this recitation, which had not been struck out,
indicated that service was effected on the corporation " 'by leaving [the citation] in the principal office during office hours.'"47 The court of appeals
found a lack of compliance with article 2029, noting that the first return did
not mention the corporation or specify its offices. 4 8 With respect to the second return, the court held that the service officer's handwritten notation of
service prevailed over the preprinted portion and that the return thus indicated personal service, rather than substituted service, that is, delivery of
process to the corporation's principal office. 49 The court therefore invalidated such service and set aside the default judgment.50
Article 2.11 of the Texas Business Corporation Act51 sets forth the procedure for effecting service on a corporation. The statute allows for service of
process on the secretary of state if a corporation's registered agent cannot be
located. 52 The secretary of state must then send a copy of the process by
41. 708 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
42. TEX. R. Civ. P. 106(a).
43. Id. 107.
44. 708 S.W.2d at 59.
45. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2029 (Vernon 1964), recodified as TEX. CIv. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 17.023 (Vernon 1986).
46. 702 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1985, no writ).

47. Id. at 279.
48. Id. at 278.
49.
S.W.2d
50.
51.

Id. at 278-79; accord Houston Pipe Coating Co. v. Houston Freightways, Inc., 679
42, 44-45 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
702 S.W.2d at 279.
TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.11 (Vernon 1980).

52. Id.
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registered mail to the corporation's registered office. 53 The decision in
Humphrey Co. v. Lowry Water Wells5 4 stands as a warning to plaintiffs' attorneys that in order to support a default judgment under article 2.11, the
pleadings must adequately allege the registered office. In Humphrey Co. the
petition merely alleged that service could be made on an individual identified
as the corporation's registered agent and specified an address where the
agent could be found; however, the pleadings made no allegation with respect to the address being the registered office. When service could not be
made on the registered agent the plaintiff served the secretary of state. The
plaintiff then filed with the court a certificate from the secretary of state
acknowledging that process was forwarded by the secretary's office to a specified address. The trial court entered a default judgment that the defendant
later challenged by writ of error. The court of appeals found that the record
was devoid of any allegation that the location to which process was forwarded was the registered office of the defendant. 55 The court, therefore, set
aside the default judgment, concluding that strict compliance with article
56
2.11 was lacking.
V.

PLEADINGS

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 63 authorizes amendments to pleadings
and provides that "any amendment offered for filing within seven days of the
date of trial.., shall be filed only after leave of the judge is obtained, which
leave shall be granted by the judge unless there is a showing that such
amendment will operate as a surprise to the opposite party."' 57 Merit Drilling Co. v. Honish,58 a case in which a sizeable judgment for the plaintiffs was
reversed on the basis of a late pleading amendment, indicates that the limits
of rule 63 cannot be ignored. Over the objection of the defendant the trial
court, two working days before trial, permitted the plaintiffs to file an
amended pleading that alleged a new cause of action. Observing that the
new matter had been known to the plaintiffs for some time and that the
defendant was apparently surprised by the new theory, the court of appeals
found that the trial court had abused its discretion. 59
Dodson v. Citizens State Bank,6° which dealt with the failure to file an
answer, should be of comfort to the harried trial practitioner. Rule 92 states
that "[w]hen a counterclaim ... is served upon a party who has made an
appearance in the action, the party so served, in the absence of a responsive
pleading, shall be deemed to have pleaded a general denial of the counter53. Id.
54. 709 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).

55. Id. at 311.

56. Id.; accord Global Truck & Equip., Inc. v. Plaschinski, 683 S.W.2d 766, 769 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ); Travis Builders, Inc. v. Graves, 583 S.W.2d 865,

867 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
57. TEX. R. Civ. P. 63.

58. 715 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).

59. Id. at 91.
60. 701 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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claim ... .,,61 In Dodson the defendant counterclaimed against the plaintiff,
but counsel for the plaintiff failed to file an answer in response. Addressing
the defendant's contention that a default judgment should have been entered
on the counterclaim, the court of appeals emphasized that rule 92 deemed
that the plaintiff had made a general denial under such circumstances and
thus the entry of a default judgment was inappropriate. 62
Finally, Villa Nova Resort, Inc. v. State63 is a warning that a plaintiff's
anticipatory pleadings may ultimately redound to the defendant's benefit.
The rule is well established that the party relying on an affirmative defense
must plead the defense. 64 Finding an exception to this settled rule, however,
the court in Villa Nova Resort concluded that "[w]hen a plaintiff anticipates
defensive matters in his pleadings, and pleads them, a defendant may rely
'65
upon the defenses even though his only pleading is a general denial."
VI. VENUE

A.

Railroad PersonalInjury Actions

In an interesting case of first impression, Burlington Northern Railroad
Co. v. Harvey,66 the court held that the 1983 amendments 67 to article 1995,68
the Texas venue statute, changed the venue rule for personal injury suits
against railroads from a mandatory provision to a permissive one. 69 Prior to
1983 all actions for personal injury brought against railroads had to be filed
either in the county in which the plaintiff resided or in the county where the
accident occurred. 70 Arguing that the 1983 amendments to article 1995 did
not change the mandatory nature of this rule, Burlington Northern contended that the case should have been transferred to the county where the
accident occurred.
Burlington Northern noted that the 1983 amendments to the venue statute re-enacted verbatim the pre-1983 mandatory provision governing suits
against railroads for personal injury. 71 According to the railroad, the Texas
61. TEX. R. Civ. P. 92.
62. 701 S.W.2d at 94.
63. 711 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
64. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 94.
65. 711 S.W.2d at 125 (citing American Communications Telecommunications, Inc. v.
Commerce N. Bank, 691 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and
Browning v. Holloway, 620 S.W.2d 611, 615 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas), writ ref'd nmr.e per
curiam, 626 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. 1981)).
66. 717 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
67. Act of June 17, 1983, ch. 385, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2119, 2119-24, repealed by
Act of Sept. 1, 1985, ch. 959, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 3242, 3246-49 (repealed as part of
recodification).
68. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (Vernon 1964), recodified as TEX. CIv. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.001-.064 (Vernon 1986).
69. 717 S.W.2d at 372.
70. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(25) (Vernon 1964), recodified as TEX. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.034 (Vernon 1986); see Tieuel v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co.,
654 S.W.2d 771, 774 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ), 1 R. McDONALD,
TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 4.31, at 431 (rev. 1981) (former article 1995(25) was mandatory).

71. Compare TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.034 (Vernon 1986) with TEX.
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legislature thus intended the venue rule to remain mandatory, although it
72
inadvertently placed the rule in the permissive section of the new statute.
Burlington Northern also argued that the mandatory language of the provision itself should prevail over the permissive characterization that appeared
73
only in the nonsubstantive chapter heading.

Acknowledging that the seemingly mandatory language in the text of the
recodified venue provision, section 15.034 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code, 74 was inconsistent with the pertinent subchapter heading,
the court nevertheless concluded that the new venue provision was merely
permissive. 75 According to the court, the subchapter headings are significant in the legislature's statutory design. 76 Thus, construing the statute as a
whole, the court held that the location of section 15.034 with other permissive venue exceptions reflected the legislature's intent to alter the previously
existing venue scheme. 77 The court also disputed Burlington Northern's as78
sertion that recent commentary interpreted section 15.034 as mandatory.
B.

Actions Concerning Land

The court in Scarth v. FirstBank & Trust Co. 79 held that an action seeking
to establish a deed of trust lien's priority over alleged homestead rights was
not governed by the mandatory provisions of the new Texas venue statute.
In reaching this finding the court analogized to similar cases decided under
former article 1995(14). 80 According to the court, section 2(a) of the new
statute,8 ' like its predecessor, is inapplicable when issues involving title to
property are merely incidental or secondary to the main purpose of the
suit.8 2 Since the dominant purpose of the suit in Scarth was to obtain only a
(Vernon 1964) (recodified 1985) (provision governing
personal injury suits against railroads re-enacted verbatim).
72. Section 15.034 of the statute appears in subch. C, which is entitled "Permissive
Venue." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 15.03-.036 (Vernon 1986).
73. Burlington Northern made several additional arguments based on the Code Construction Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5429b-2, § 3.06 (Vernon Supp. 1983), and other
rules of statutory construction, all of which were rejected by the court. 717 S.W.2d at 375-77.
74. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.034 (Vernon 1986).
75. 717 S.W.2d at 375.
76. -Id. at 377.
77. 'Id. at 375. In passing, the court noted that the traditional legislative history accompanying legislation was absent since there were no floor debates on or amendments to Senate Bill
898 before passage. Id. at 376 (for background information on legislative history the court
cited Price, New Texas Venue Statute: Legislative History, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 855, 857
(1984)).
78. 717 S.W.2d at 375 (citing 1 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 4.31 (Cum.
Supp. 1985), and 3 W. DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE §§ 61.01, 61.02 (1985)).
79. 711 S.W.2d 140, 143-44 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1986, no writ).
80. Id. at 143 (citing Republic Nat'l Bank v. Estes, 422 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1967, no writ) and Holcomb v. Williams, 194 S.W. 631, 632 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1917, no writ)).
81. Act of June 17, 1983, ch. 385, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2119, 2120 (codified at TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(2)(a)), repealed by Act of Sept. 1, 1985, ch. 959, § 1, 1985
Tex. Gen. Laws 3242, 3246-49, recodified as TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.011
(Vernon 1986). Section 15.011 is a mandatory venue provision for recovery or partition of real
property, removal of encumbrances on real property, or quieting title to real property. Id.
82. 711 S.W.2d at 143-44.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(25)
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declaration regarding the validity of the plaintiff's lien, the court followed
v. Langdeau8 3 and refused to apply
the supreme court's teaching in Bennett
84
provision.
venue
the mandatory
C. Appeal of Probate Court Venue Rulings
Section 15.064 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides
that no interlocutory appeal lies from a trial court's venue determination. 85
Certain orders of a probate court, however, are appealable without disposing
of the entire probate proceeding. 86 Finding no conflict between these rules,
the court in Grounds v. Lett 87 held that a probate court's order overruling a
motion to transfer venue was not a final appealable order.8 8 The distinguishing factor is whether an order adjudicates a substantial right.8 9 The court
reasoned that a venue ruling did not affect the substantial rights of any party
and stressed that further hearings would be necessary before the subject of
dispute in the case was actually adjudicated. 90
D. Change of Venue
A change of venue application, if duly made, will be granted unless attacked by affidavit of a credible person disputing either the credibility of the
party making the application or the facts set out in the application. 9 1 Under
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 258 such an attack will constitute an issue to
be tried by the judge. 92 According to Thompson v. Mayes,93 an affidavit stating simply that the party applying for a change in venue can obtain a fair
and impartial trial in the county of suit and that the applicant's affidavits are
94
inaccurate is sufficient to raise and frame a triable issue under rule 258.
VII.

PARTIES

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) provides that one or more members
of a class may sue on behalf of the entire class if, among other things, questions of law or fact are common to the class. 95 According to the court in
83. 362 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. 1962).
84. 711 S.W.2d at 142.

85. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.064 (Vernon 1986); see also TEX. R. Civ. P.
87(b).
86. See Estate of Wright, 676 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (citing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 55(a) (Vernon 1980) (declaration of heirship is a
final judgment)); Mossier v. Johnson, 565 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (denial of application to probate a will is final and appealable
without disposing of entire probate proceeding)).
87. 718 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
88. Id. at 39.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. TEX. R. Civ. P. 258.
92. Id.
93. 707 S.W.2d 951*(Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, no writ).
94. Id. at 958.
95. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
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Wente v. Georgia-PacificCorp.,96 an action for usury, rule 42(a) is satisfied if
at least some common questions of law or fact exist. 97 The court did not
require that all or even a substantial portion of the questions of law or fact be
common to the class. 98 Disputing a Louisiana court that held that common
questions of both law and fact must exist, 99 the Wente court remarked that
the common issue may be one either of law or fact. 1°° Nevertheless, the
Wente appellate court affirmed the trial court's refusal to certify the class.
Observing that the Texas usury statute' 0 1 is structured in a way that emphasizes the category into which a debtor's account falls, the court concluded
that the initial questions in the suit would be individual rather than common. 10 2 The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in deciding the class certification question while discovery remained uncompleted, because the discovery remaining to be conducted could not have assisted the court's determination of whether common questions of fact or law
03
existed. 1
Shebay v. Davis 10 4 focused on another facet of the class action rule.
Under subsection (c)(2) of rule 42 a class action notice must advise class
members that they have the right to be excluded from the class if they so
request by a specified date.' 0 5 After appellant Shebay received notice pursuant to this rule, he filed a petition in intervention for himself and on behalf of
a subclass. The trial court refused to certify the subclass and, over Shebay's
objection, approved a settlement agreement struck between the plaintiff-representative and the defendant. On appeal, Shebay attacked the validity of
the settlement and also claimed that, if the settlement was valid, he was not
bound by the settlement terms since he had elected to exclude himself from
the class. The court rejected this latter argument after finding no evidence in
the record that Shebay had excluded himself from the class in accordance
with the rule's requirements.' 0 6 Since the notice rule expressly permitted a
member of the class to enter an appearance in the case, Shebay's mere filing
of a petition in intervention did not fulfill the formal requirements for
07
exclusion.'
Two cases decided by the Texas Supreme Court during the Survey period
96. 712 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no writ).
97. Id. at 255.
98. Id. Indeed, the court noted that it is conceivable that a single common question would
satisfy rule 42(a) and provide adequate grounds for a class action. Id.
99. See Ward v. Luttrell, 292 F. Supp. 165, 168 (E.D. La. 1968).
100. "712 S.W.2d at 255.
101. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.04 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1987).
102. 712 S.W.2d at 256-57. Although the court rested its holding on the single ground that
no questions of law or fact common to the class existed, the court also noted that under rule
42(b) the plaintiff would not have been able to establish the typicality of his claims or that the
common questions predominated over individual questions. Id. at 257-58 n.6; see TEX. R.
Civ. P. 42(b) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
103. 712 S.W.2d at 258-59.
104. 717 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986, no writ).
105. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(c)(2)(B).
106. 717 S.W.2d at 681.
107. Id.; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(c)(2)(D) (any member of class who does not request exclusion may enter an appearance through counsel).
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concerned the standard of review when an alleged indispensable party has
not been joined in the action. Browning v. Placke 018 presented the question
of whether one district court could declare the judgment of another district
court void due to the nonjoinder of an alleged indispensable party. The
supreme court conditionally granted a writ of mandamus in Browning directing the respondent trial court judge to vacate his order that declared a
Dallas district court judgment void. 109 In doing so, the supreme court observed that a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction is not subject to
collateral attack by another court of equal jurisdiction unless the judgment is
void. 0 Since a judgment is void only when it is shown that the court lacked
jurisdiction,"'I the supreme court held that the alleged failure to join an indispensable party did not render the judgment void.' 12 In so ruling, the
court reconfirmed its long-standing view that rarely could a party exist who
to
is so indispensable that his absence would deprive the court of jurisdiction
13
adjudicate the controversy between the parties before the court.'
In Allison v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. 114 the respondent asserted,

through an unverified special exception, the nonjoinder of an alleged necessary party. Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 39,115 however, a verified
plea is required in order to challenge a defect of parties. Because of the
respondent's failure to comply with this requirement the court limited its
inquiry to whether the trial court's failure to join the allegedly necessary
party constituted fundamental error.11 6 The nonjoinder was not fundamental error.

17

Trails East v. Mustafa 118 discussed whether a plaintiff is required to replead upon discovering the true name of a defendant who has been using an
assumed name. According to the court, a plaintiff is not required to replead
once he discovers the true name of a partnership, unincorporated association, private corporation, or individual doing business under an assumed
name.'" 9 The court noted that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 28,120 which
name on motion of the court or
permits the court to substitute a party's true
12 1
any party, is permissive, not mandatory.
108. 698 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1985).
109. Id. at 363.
110. Id. (citing Austin Independent School District v. Sierra Club, 495 S.W.2d 878, 881
(Tex. 1973)).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.; see Pirtle v. Gregory, 629 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam), discussed in
Figari, Graves & Dwyer, Texas Civil Procedure,Annual Survey of Texas Law, 37 Sw. L.J. 289,
306 (1983); Cooper v. Texas Gulf Indus., 513 S.W.2d 200, 204 (Tex. 1974).
114. 703 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam).
115. TEX. R. Civ. P. 39.
116. 703 S.W.2d at 638.
117. Id.; see also Clear Lake City Water Auth. v. Clear Lake Utils. Co., 549 S.W.2d 385,
390 (Tex. 1977) (trial court's decision to proceed in absence of a party is not fundamental error
in all cases).
118. 713 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
119. Id. at 424.
120. TEX. R. Civ. P. 28.
121. 713 S.W.2d at 424.
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VIII.

DISCOVERY

A. Duty to Supplement Discovery
A number of decisions during the survey period analyzed the duty imposed by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166b(5)1 22 to supplement discovery
and the appropriate sanctions resulting from failure to comply with that
duty. In Morrow v. HE.B., Inc.,123 a slip and fall case, the defendant H.E.B.
had been asked for the names and addresses of employees who had first
come to the plaintiff's aid after her fall. The defendant answered and gave
the address of one of the employees as simply "Missouri." Approximately
three weeks before trial the defendant discovered that the employee whose
address was listed as Missouri was living in San Antonio, Texas. H.E.B.,
however, did not supplement its answers to interrogatories to include this
information. As a result of H.E.B.'s failure to supplement the trial court
excluded the employee's testimony at trial. The Texas Supreme Court determined that the trial court had not abused its discretion in excluding the
testimony because rule 166b(5) placed a duty on the defendant to supplement its answer and, under rule 215(5), 124 the failure to supplement results
in the automatic sanction of exclusion, unless the defendant demonstrates
good cause as to why the testimony should be allowed. 125 The supreme
court held that the defendant did not show good cause even though the defendant had offered to allow the plaintiff to take the employee's deposition
prior to his testimony and even if there was no surprise to the plaintiff by the
26
testimony. 1
In Gannett Outdoor Co. v. Kubeczka 127 the court of appeals upheld a trial
judge's decision to allow an unidentified rebuttal witness to testify despite
the defendant's assertion that the witness was an expert witness. In this action brought against the owners of a billboard that had collapsed on the
plaintiff's home, the defendant's employees denied the existence of any written report reflecting the dangerous condition of the billboard. The plaintiff,
however, called to testify a design engineer who had been employed by the
defendant to examine the billboard and to render a report reflecting
problems with the billboard. The plaintiff had not identified the engineer
prior to trial, as required by the discovery rules. 1 28 The court of appeals
held, however, that the witness was a rebuttal witness called to refute sur122. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(5).
123. 714 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1986).
124. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(5).
125. 714 S.W.2d at 297.
126. Id. at 298; see also Yeldell v. Holiday Hills Retirement & Nursing Center, 701 S.W.2d
243, 247 (Tex. 1985) (not necessary to plead surprise when objecting to testimony because of
other party's failure to supplement discovery).
In Brewer v. Isom, 704 S.W.2d 911, 912 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ), the plaintiff
failed to identify a witness in response to an interrogatory asking for the names of persons with
knowledge of facts and circumstances pertaining to the lawsuit. The court of appeals held that
the trial court improperly allowed the unidentified person to testify because the plaintiff failed
to demonstrate good cause for allowing the testimony. Id.
127. 710 S.W.2d 79, 85 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
128. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166(b)(2)(e).
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prise testimony, not an expert witness. 129 Further, the court noted that the
engineer was obviously known to the defendant, who had formerly employed
him, and that, in absence of the untruthful testimony by the defendant's
witnesses, the engineer's testimony would not have been necessary. 130 The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony because, in
light of the circumstances, the plaintiff had shown that good cause compelled the admission of the engineer's testimony. 131
First City Bank v. Global Auctioneers, Inc.132 applied the duty to supplement discovery and the related sanction of exclusion to discovery of documents. Global involved an action on a promissory note in which the
defendant customer claimed that the plaintiff bank had improperly allowed
unauthorized transfers from Global's accounts. During discovery the defendant specifically requested that the bank identify all written agreements
by which funds could be transferred out of the accounts in question. In its
answers the bank only mentioned signature cards and corporate resolutions.
At trial the bank sought to offer into evidence a letter from a third-party
defendant to the bank setting out the persons who were authorized to make
transactions concerning the accounts in question. Although the bank apparently learned about the letter only after the trial had started, the court of
appeals held that the bank had failed to reasonably supplement its response. 133 Thus, the court found that the trial court had not abused its dis134
cretion in excluding the evidence.
B.

Privilege in the Discovery Context

During the Survey period Texas courts addressed a number of issues related to assertions of privilege in the discovery context. In Jordanv. Court of
Appeals 135 the supreme court construed article 4447d that provides for a
privilege related to records and proceedings of hospital committees, medical
organizations, and extended care facilities. 136 In particular, the court was
asked to determine what documents fall within the scope of the statutory
term "records and proceedings" of such committees. The court decided that
the privilege covers documents that have been prepared by or under the direction of the committee for the committee's own purposes. 137 The court
pointed to minutes of committee meetings, correspondence between committee members that is related to the deliberation process, and any final committee product, such as recommendations, as examples of documents
covered by the privilege. 138 The court held, however, that documents gratuitously submitted to the committee or created without committee impetus
129. 710 S.W.2d at 84.

130. Id.
131. Id. at 85.
132. 708 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
133. Id. at 15.

134. Id.
135. 701 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. 1985).
136. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4447d (Vernon 1976).

137. 701 S.W.2d at 648.
138. Id.
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are not protected by the privilege.1 39 In this particular case, the court determined that several documents in question were privileged, but held that the
trial court had not erred in ordering production of the documents because
the privilege had been waived.14 0 The documents had been disclosed to a
grand jury investigating the operations of a unit at the hospital, but the record was completely silent as to the circumstances surrounding the disclosure. Holding that the hospital and doctors had failed to carry their burden
of proving that no waiver of the privilege had occurred as a result of the
grand jury's possession of the materials, the court upheld the trial court's
41
discovery order requiring production.
The court in Dewitt & Rearick, Inc. v. Ferguson142 examined the ability of
a plaintiff to assert a privilege with respect to information materially relevant
to the action. In this case, the defendants had entered into contracts with
two separate groups of purchasers for the sale of the same parcel of real
estate. The plaintiffs in this action, representatives of one group of purchasers, sued for unpaid real estate commissions. The representative of the other
group had previously sued for specific performance of their contract and
settled with the defendants. The plaintiffs sought, by discovery, to determine
the settlement basis of the suit between the defendants and the other group
of purchasers. The defendant vendors counterclaimed apparently to recover
the sums that had been paid in settlement of the first suit. In response to the
plaintiff's discovery request the defendants asserted the attorney-client privilege, reasoning that the privilege applied because they had settled the first
suit on advice of counsel. The court of appeals held that the vendors could
not, on the one hand, continue the prosecution of the counterclaim against
the second group of purchasers and, at the same time, assert offensively the
attorney-client privilege so as to prevent discovery of information materially
relevant to the suit. 143
Several cases during the Survey period considered issues related to the
investigative privilege, specified in rule 166b(3)(d),'" that generally protects
information prepared in connection with the prosecution or defense of a lawsuit. In one such case, Turbodyne Corp. v. Heard, 45 after a fire explosion
occurred at a refinery the plaintiff insurance company conducted an investigation into the causes of the accident. After the investigation and after a
settlement had been reached concerning coverage of the policy between the
insurance company and its insured, the insurance company commenced a
subrogation action against the manufacturer of the catalytic cracking unit
involved in the fire. The defendant manufacturer filed a motion to compel
production of the documents prepared by the insurance company's employees or experts. The insurance company asserted in response that such docu139. Id.

140. Id. at 649.
141. Id.
142. 699 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, no writ).
143. Id. at 694; accord Ginsberg v. Fifth Ct. of Appeals, 686 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. 1985).

144. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(3)(d).
145.

720 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam).
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ments were privileged. The supreme court noted that postaccident
investigations are not automatically privileged merely because an accident
occurred. 146 The court held that documents prepared by an insurance company in connection with the settlement of a claim with its insured are not
protected from discovery in a later subrogation suit.1 4 7 The affidavit submitted by the insurance company in the trial court did not affirmatively state
that the documents were prepared in connection with or in anticipation of a
subrogation suit; 148 thus, the court left open the possibility of a different
result in a future case if such affidavits are submitted.
In Robinson v. Harkins & Co. 149 the supreme court held that an insurance
company's investigation report made in connection with a potential workmen's compensation claim was discoverable in a personal injury action by
the wife of the injured worker against the worker's employer when the action
arose from the same incident as the workmen's compensation claim. 150 The
privilege against discovery of the report would have applied with respect to
the worker's claim. 151
In Tucker v. Gayle 152 an employee who was injured on the defendant's
property sought all reports and evaluations made by the defendant after the
accident but prior to the filing of the suit. The court recognized that in
many industrial accidents the plaintiff does not have access to the site of the
accident; 153 thus, the court held that the reports were discoverable. 154 As a
primary basis for its ruling, the court noted that the reports were routinely
prepared under the normal course and scope of the defendant's operations,
and their purpose was to discover the cause of accidents in order to prevent
future occurrences rather than prepare for a lawsuit. 155
During the Survey period several courts denied discovery on the basis of
the investigative privilege. In an action arising out of a railroad collision, the
defendant in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. Kirk 156 asserted that a
notebook compiled by one of its employees during the investigation of the
collision was privileged. Agreeing with this contention, the court of appeals
held that the employee was involved in an investigation of the occurrence
out of which the claim had arisen; that the employee may have also been
57
investigating the occurrence for possible criminal activity was irrelevant.1
58
In Monroe v. Fuller the plaintiffs, who were lessors and royalty interest
owners in certain oil and gas leases, sought to discover accounting studies
146. Id. at 804.
147. Id.

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
711 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam).
Id. at 621; accord Allen v. Humphreys, 559 S.W.2d 798, 803 (Tex. 1977).
See 711 S.W.2d at 621.
709 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
Id. at 250.
Id.
Id.
705 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, no writ).
Id. at 832.
701 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, no writ).
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prepared by the defendant lessee relating to the royalty payments. Noting
that at the time the accounting documents were prepared the defendant believed that litigation with the plaintiffs was imminent, and that one royalty
owner had already filed suit, the court of appeals held that the documents
159
were privileged under rule 166b(3)(d).
As noted in the last Survey, the supreme court in Peeples v. Honorable
Fourth Supreme Judicial District160 outlined the procedures for excluding
documents from discovery on the grounds of privilege. 161 In general, the
party who asserts privilege must specifically plead the particular privilege
and produce evidence supporting the claim. 162 The recent decisions analyze
the application of the procedures set forth in Peeples. In the first case, Weisel Enterprises v. Curry,163 the defendant submitted to the trial court a summary of documents allegedly protected by the attorney-client and attorney
work product privilege. The summary contained the heading "AttorneyClient/Attorney Work Product."' 164 The supreme court held that the summary was no evidence that any particular document was protected by a specific privilege. It was merely an unverified, global allegation that the list of
documents was protected by one or both privileges. 165 Accordingly, the
court held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying discovery of
the documents, especially without conducting an in camera review. 166 The
supreme court noted that when a party seeks to protect documents from
discovery on the basis of relevancy or harassment, affidavits or live testimony may be sufficient proof, but when a party asserts a claim of privilege,
the court may require that the party submit the documents themselves in
order to substantiate the claim. 167 Consistent with the foregoing decision,
the court in Group Hospital Service, Inc. v. Dellana168 held that the party
resisting discovery had complied with the procedures set forth in Peeples by
claiming privilege and actually submitting the documents in question to the
169
trial court for an in camera inspection.
City of Denison v. Grisham 170 illustrates that a privilege regarding a document may be waived when the document is used to refresh the recollection of
a witness. In Denison the plaintiff had refreshed his memory while testifying
at his deposition by examining certain notes prepared by himself and his
attorney. Relying on Texas Rule of Evidence 611171 the appellate court
ruled that plaintiff had waived any privilege with respect to the notes. 172
159.
160.
161.
162.

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 75.
701 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. 1985).
Figari, 1986 Annual Survey, supra note 2, at 508-09.
701 S.W.2d at 637.

718 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam).
Id. at 58.
Id.
Id.
Id.
701 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ).
Id.at 77.
716 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. App.-Da~las 1986, no writ).

171. TEX. R. EvID. 611.

172. 716 S.W.2d at 123.
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Discovery from Nonparties

Two cases discuss issues related to discovery from nonparties, actual or
imaginary. In a mandamus proceeding arising from the discovery phase of
the litigation over the no-pass, no-play rule the supreme court in Texas Education Agency v. Anthony 173 held that the trial court improperly required
over 1000 nonparty public school districts to provide detailed statistical information concerning the racial backgrounds of students declared ineligible
for extracurricular activity. 174 The basis for the ruling was the failure of the
trial court to provide the nonparty school districts with notice and a hearing
175
before entering an order requiring production.
In Kidd Pipeline & Specialties, Inc. v. Campagna176 the defendant sought
on a number of occasions to take the deposition of the president of the plaintiff corporation, but the deponent refused to appear for her deposition. Subsequently, she did appear for her deposition but claimed that she no longer
worked for plaintiff corporation, although she still had an office there.
Notwithstanding these claims, the court of appeals held that the trial court
properly granted sanctions against the plaintiff for the failure of the deponent to testify fully at her deposition.1 77 The court noted that the deponent
was being furnished with an office by the plaintiff and was the plaintiff's
largest shareholder. 178 In addition, the court pointed out that the deponent
had been president of the plaintiff corporation at the time the deposition was
179
originally requested.
D. Medical Examinations
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 167a 180 provides, in general, that when the
mental or physical condition of a party is in controversy, the trial court may
order the party to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician. The rule does not, however, state who is to choose the examining physician. In Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Street 181 the court held that
when a motion is made under rule 167a the trial court may choose an independent and neutral physician to conduct the medical examination; the
movant does not have an absolute right to choose the examining
physician. 182
E. Mandamus Relief in Discovery
As most practitioners are aware, the supreme court has demonstrated a
173. 700 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. 1985).
174. Id. at 195.
175. Id.; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 167(4).

176. 712 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
177. Id. at 242.
178. Id. at 241.
179. Id. at 242.

180. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167a.
181. 702 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth), reh'g denied, 707 S.W.2d 277 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
182. 702 S.W.2d at 780-81.
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willingness to issue writs of mandamus in discovery proceedings. 183 The
holding in Street v. Second Court ofAppeals,' 8 4 however, indicates that mandamus relief is not available for all aspects of discovery proceedings. In
Street a party against whom attorney's fees were awarded as discovery sanctions sought mandamus relief. The supreme court concluded that mandamus relief was not available because the party had an adequate remedy by
appeal. 185 The court distinguished Street from situations in which the trial
court has sought to compel disclosure of privileged material and the appellate remedy is not adequate. 18 6 That a party may or may not recover the
money it pays in sanctions did not, according to the court, demonstrate the
87
inadequacy of the appellate remedy.'
IX.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A.

Sufficiency of Evidence

A number of decisions during the Survey period discuss the types of proof
that support or defeat a motion for summary judgment. In Vaughn v. Burroughs Corp. 18 8 the movant filed three separate motions for summary judgment, but on the third motion the movant neither attached its summary
judgment proof to the motion nor incorporated by reference the evidence
attached to the previous motions. Nonetheless, the court of appeals held
that the trial court's consideration of the evidence attached to the prior motions was not erroneous. 189 Further, the court decided that any defects in
the movant's proof were waived by the failure of the other party to object to
the lack of incorporation of the previous evidence. 190
Campbell v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust 191 held that statements in an affidavit that are based upon "the best of affiant's knowledge" do not qualify as
summary judgment evidence at all and should not be considered by the trial
court. 192 The opponent to a summary judgment motion in Feldman v.
ManufacturersHanover Mortgage Corp.193 relied only on his verified pleadings to oppose the motion for summary judgment. Recognizing the wellsettled proposition that pleadings, even if sworn, do not constitute proper
summary judgment proof, the court of appeals held that verified pleadings
183.
S.W.2d
184.
185.

Eg., Jampole v. Touchy, 673 S.W.2d 569, 576 (Tex. 1984); Allen v. Humphreys, 559
798, 804 (Tex. 1977); Barker v. Dunham, 551 S.W.2d 41, 42 (Tex. 1977).
715 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam).
Id. at 639-40.

186. Id.
187. Id.
188. 705 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
189. Id. at 248; accord Cousson v. Disch, 629 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1981,
writ dism'd) (trial court can rely on evidence filed but not attached to motion when deciding a
summary judgment motion). But see Corpus Christi Municipal Gas Corp. v. Tuloso-Midway
Indep. School Dist., 595, S.W.2d 203, 204-05 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (supporting proof must be attached to summary judgment motion).
190. 705 S.W.2d at 248.
191. 705 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
192. Id. at 402.
193. 704 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41

are not sufficient summary judgment proof. 194 According to the court, reliance on verified pleadings is more than a defect in form, and an objection is
not necessary to preserve the error. 195

Finally, in River Oaks Shopping Center v. Pagan196 both parties moved for
summary judgment. The defendant's motion incorporated by reference the
pleadings on file in the cause, including the plaintiff's pleadings. Although
the proof submitted in support of the defendant's motion for summary judgment was insufficient, the court of appeals concluded that the defendant was
entitled to judgment based on the summary judgment proof that was attached to the plaintiff's motion. 19 7 Recognizing that this case presented a
novel situation, the appellate court stated that because of logic and judicial
economy it should not matter which party presents the evidence for summary judgment as long as the evidence before the trial court provides the
court with a sufficient basis to rule on the cross-motions for summary
judgment. 198

B.

Summary Judgment Procedure

During the Survey period the courts also considered procedural questions
related to summary judgment motions. In Edwards v. State Bank 199 the
nonmovant claimed that he had not received notice of a summary judgment
hearing more than twenty-one days prior to the hearing. 2°0 The nonmovant
supported his claim by the deposition testimony of his attorney who denied
receiving a notice letter about the hearing. Although the movant submitted
an affidavit demonstrating the preparation and mailing of the notice letter,
the court of appeals concluded that a material issue of fact existed as to
whether the notice letter was mailed. 20 1 Nonetheless, the court concluded
that the issue of notice was not a factual issue that necessarily vitiated the
summary judgment rendered by the district court, but was a procedural
anomaly to be corrected by the trial court in response to a motion for new
trial.20 2 Since the trial court had failed to correct the procedural problem in
response to the motion for new trial, the court of appeals remanded the case
of whether the notice
to the district court for a hearing and determination
20 3
was mailed to the nonmovant's attorney.
A response to a summary judgment motion was at issue in Fillion v. David
Silvers Co. 204 The nonmovant in Fillion timely filed a response to a motion
for summary judgment. Less than seven days prior to the summary judg194. Id. at 425.
195. Id.
196. 712 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
197. Id. at 193.
198. Id.
199. 705 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1986, no writ).
200. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c) (motion for summary judgment and supporting affidavits must be filed and served at least 21 days before summary judgment hearing).
201. 705 S.W.2d at 843.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. 709 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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ment hearing, however, the nonmovant filed a supplemental response and a
second supplemental response to the summary judgment motion. Contrary
to the requirements of rule 166-A(c), 20 5 the nonmovant did not obtain leave
of court before filing the supplemental responses. The court of appeals concluded that the supplemental responses were not timely filed and, because
the nonmovant had not obtained leave of the district court for filing the
supplemental responses, the supplemental responses could not be considered
20 6
by the trial court or the court of appeals.
In a case regarding a breach of a lease agreement, Great-NessProfessional
Services, Inc. v. FirstNational Bank,20 7 the movant mischaracterized the suit
by alleging in the motion for summary judgment that the suit was on a
sworn account and that the defendants had defaulted in making payments
on the "account." The trial court granted the summary judgment motion.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and ruled that misclassification of the specific ground for summary judgment was sufficient to
defeat the motion
even though no genuine material issue of fact was in
20 8
controversy.
C. Attorney's Fees
Two cases considered issues related to proof of attorney's fees with respect
to a summary judgment motion. In Giao v. Smith & Lamm 209 a law firm
filed an action seeking to recover attorney's fees from its former client. In
response to a motion for summary judgment filed by the law firm the client's
new attorney filed an affidavit challenging the amount of attorney's fees that
were being sought. Rejecting the contention that the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibited the new attorney from testifying as to fees, the
court held that an affidavit by an attorney representing a party litigating over
attorney's fees, whether the affidavit supported or contradicted the reasonableness of the fees, was admissible expert testimony. 210 Accordingly, the
appellate court held that the attorney's affidavit raised a fact issue that precluded a summary judgment. 2 11 Similarly, in Engel v. Pettit 212 the court
held that a controverting affidavit filed in response to a motion for summary
judgment, stating that an attorney's fee requested was excessive and unreasonable, was sufficient to create a material issue of fact and defeat the sum213
mary judgment motion.
205. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c) (party adverse to summary judgment motion may file and
serve response to motion not later than 7 days before hearing, unless leave of court is granted).
206. 709 S.W.2d at 244.
207. 704 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
208. Id. at 918. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c) provides that "[t]he motion for summary judgment shall state the specific grounds therefor."
209. 714 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1986, no writ).
210. Id. at 148; see General Specialties, Inc. v. Charter Nat'l Bank, 687 S.W.2d 772, 774
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ); Gifford v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 613
S.W.2d 43, 46 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
211. 714 S.W.2d at 149.
212. 713 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
213. Id. at 773.
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D. Preservationof Error
Two supreme court cases addressed questions regarding preservation of
error in summary judgment proceedings. In State Board of Insurance v.
Westland Film Industries2 14 the court of appeals had reversed a summary
judgment on a ground that the nonmovant neither raised in the trial court
nor presented as a point of error to the court of appeals. The supreme court
held that the court of appeals was not authorized to reverse the trial court's
judgment in the absence of a properly assigned error, and that issues not
expressly presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal as
holding was
grounds for reversal of the summary judgment. 2 15 A similar
216
Inc.
Franclen,
JR.
v.
Co.
Insurance
Prudential
in
made
also
X.

SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION

A. Submission Form
Although Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 277217 was amended in 1973 to
authorize the submission of special issues in a broad form, courts have continued to discuss the form of submission. In a case involving a breach of a
loan commitment, Allen Recreational Development Corp. v. Republic of
Texas Savings Association,218 the trial court submitted an issue on whether
the plaintiffs, the borrowers, performed their obligations under the commitment letter in question. The jury answered affirmatively. On appeal, the
defendant lender contended that the jury, in responding to the issue, considered evidence of a waiver by the defendant of the obligations under the commitment letter. Thus, according to the defendant, an instruction on waiver
should have been submitted to the jury. Disagreeing with this contention,
the supreme court held that the broadly worded issue submitted by the trial
court was proper. 219 Although the court recognized that the trial court
should have submitted appropriate accompanying instructions with the
broad issue, the court declined to say that failure to submit accompanying
instructions was a reversible error per se. The court noted that the absence
of an instruction on waiver would have been detrimental only to the borrower, the party who received the favorable jury verdict. Accordingly, the
to demonstrate harm from the
court concluded that the lender had failed
220
failure to include a waiver instruction.
Two decisions during the Survey period discussed the broad submission
form in fraud cases. In Coronado Transmission Co. v. O'Shea 22 1 the trial
court submitted an issue asking the jury to determine if the defendant had
214. 705 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. 1986).
215. Id. at 696; accord City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 675
(Tex. 1979).
216. 710 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Tex. 1986).
217. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.

218.
219.
220.
221.

710 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1986).
Id. at 555.
Id.
703 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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made a fraudulent misrepresentation to the plaintiff concerning the plaintiff's entitlement to a net revenue interest in a pipeline project. In conjunction with the issue the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of
fraudulent misrepresentation, including the elements of materiality, intent,
and reliance. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court's submis222
sion of the fraud claim was proper and affirmed the trial court's judgment.
On the other hand, in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Crow 223 the court ruled that an issue

on causation was also necessary. 224 The trial court apparently submitted an
issue inquiring as to whether the defendant had made fraudulent representations to the plaintiff. The special issue was accompanied by an instruction
that set forth the elements for fraud, including the elements of reliance and
injury. Concluding that this submission was error, the appellate court noted
that instructions are a means to aid the jury in answering special issues;
instructions cannot supply a missing element in a cause of action. 22 5 The
court ruled that an issue on causation was necessary in the fraud action;
merely giving the jury a definition of fraudulent conduct did not supply a
226
finding of causation.
The proper form of special issues for damages in a wrongful death and
survival action was the subject of Ford Motor Co. v. Durrill.227 The district
court submitted an issue asking the jury to find the sum of money that
should have been assessed as exemplary damages against the defendant "for
the death of" of the plaintiffs' child. 228 The defendant argued that the issue,

as worded, allowed the plaintiffs improperly to recover damages under the
wrongful death statute rather than under the survival statute.2 29 Rejecting
this contention, the court of appeals ruled that although the question might
have been worded differently, it was not so improper as to warrant a reversal. 230 The defendant also argued that the issue that fixed compensatory
damages was improper because it asked the jury to consider both physical
pain and suffering and mental anguish. The appellate court found that the
two elements of damages, physical pain and suffering, and mental anguish,
were distinguishable, not duplicitous; therefore, the court decided that the
special issue did not authorize a double recovery. 231 Further, the court
noted that the issue was accompanied by limiting instructions that told the
jury to consider each element of damage separately and not to include dam2 32
ages for one element in any other element.

222. Id. at 734-35.
223. 704 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).
224. Id. at 854.

225. Id.
226. Id.
227.
228.
229.
ages in
230.
231.
232.

714 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
Id. at 334.
Apparently the problem with the special issue was the reference to exemplary damconnection with the child's death.
714 S.W.2d at 334.
Id. at 343.
Id.
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B. Preservationof Error
There were significant developments during the Survey period regarding
preservation of error to objectionable special issues and instructions. In
Morris v. Holt 233 the defendant claimed that the special issue submitted by
the trial court had improperly placed the burden of proof upon him.
Although the defendant had submitted his own special issue in a substantially correct form, the issue was refused by the trial court, and the defendant did not object to the trial court's failure to submit the issue. Construing
rule 279,234 the supreme court held that the defendant's written request for
submission of an issue was sufficient to preserve his complaint on appeal that
the trial court inadvertently failed to submit the issue. 235 The supreme court
held that, with respect to issues relied upon by an opponent, a party may
preserve error to the trial court's failure to submit an issue by making a
or by requesting submission of the issue in substantimely, specific objection
236
tially correct form.
In Aero Energy, Inc. v. Circle C DrillingCo.237 the trial court submitted an
issue to the jury inquiring as to the existence of a joint venture between two
parties. The appellant claimed on appeal that there was no evidence to support the submission of that issue. In the trial court, however, the appellant
had objected to the issue on the grounds that one of the parties to the alleged
venture was not a party to the contract in dispute and the contract specifically disclaimed any partnership relationship between the two parties. Noting that a party objecting to a charge must point out distinctly the matter to
which he objects and the grounds for the objections, 238 the supreme court
held that the objection to the issue was not sufficient to preserve a no evi23 9
dence point.
C. Negative Answers to Issues
Grenwelge v. Shamrock Reconstructors,Inc.240 set forth a proposition that
the trial practitioner often overlooks. In this case the jury answered "no" to
a defendant's issue inquiring whether the plaintiff contractor breached a construction contract. Based on that answer, the trial judge entered a judgment
in favor of the plaintiff. The supreme court recognized that the jury's negative answer was not equivalent to an affirmative finding of substantial performance of the contract by the plaintiff. 24' The court noted that a negative
answer to a special issue is nothing more than a finding that a party has
24 2
failed to carry its burden of proving a particular fact.
233. 714 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. 1986).

234. TEX. R. Civ. P. 279.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

714 S.W.2d at 312.
Id.
699 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. 1985).
See TEx. R. Civ. P. 274.
Id. at 822.
705 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. 1986).
Id. at 694.
Id.; accord C & R Transport, Inc. v. Campbell, 406 S.W.2d 191, 194 (Tex. 1966).
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XI.
A.

JURY PRACTICE

Peremptory Challenges

A number of courts during the Survey period addressed questions related
to peremptory challenges. In Garcia v. Central Power & Light Co.,243 a
wrongful death suit involving multiple defendants, the plaintiff contended
that the trial court improperly allowed the defendants an extra number of
peremptory challenges. On the other hand, the defendants argued that they
were entitled to extra peremptory challenges because there was potential antagonism among them, as evidenced by their pleadings wherein some of the
defendants claimed that the other defendants were the sole cause of the accident. Also, the defendants pointed out that they had filed cross-actions
against each other affirmatively seeking indemnity and contribution. The
supreme court disagreed with the defendants' arguments and observed that
the defendants, during the voir dire examination, had made statements to
the effect that the plaintiff's suit did not "have any merit against any of the
people that were sued in the case."'244 Further, the supreme court held that
while the pleadings alone supported a finding of antagonism, they were not
the only factors in determining whether antagonism existed. 245 According
to the court the trial judge must consider the pleadings, information disclosed by pretrial discovery, representations made during voir dire of the
jury panel, and any other information brought to the attention of the trial
court before the exercise of the peremptory strikes. 24 6 Accordingly, the
court held that the trial court committed reversible error in awarding additional peremptory challenges to the defendants.247
In Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Reynolds 248 the plaintiff and one of
the defendants collaborated with one another in making their peremptory
challenges to the jury. Shortly thereafter the plaintiff dismissed the action
against that particular defendant. On appeal one of the other defendants
claimed that it should have been awarded extra peremptory challenges by
the trial court because the collaboration had occurred with an unspoken understanding that cooperation by the collaborating defendant would be reciprocated by the plaintiff. The court of appeals disagreed with that contention
and pointed out that nothing in the record indicated that the collaborating
defendant wanted the jury to answer special issues in a way that would detrimentally affect the other defendant. 249 In reaching its decision the court
also relied on the trial court's finding, after a hearing, that the plaintiff did
not receive an unfair advantage by the award of additional peremptory chal250
lenges to the collaborating defendant.
243.

704 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. 1986).

244. Id. at 736.
245. Id. at 737.
246. Id.; Patterson Dental Co. v. Dunn, 592 S.W.2d 914, 919 (Tex. 1979).
247. 704 S.W.2d at 737.
248. 712 S.W.2d 761 (Tex App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
249. Id. at 772.

250. Id.
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In Lopez v. Foremost Paving, Inc.25 1 the supreme court again addressed
the question of apportioning peremptory challenges. The court discussed
the test used to determine whether a trial court's improper award of additional peremptory strikes results in reversible error. The court noted that
the traditional "harmless error" rule had been realized with respect to a trial
court committing error in awarding strikes. The court reaffirmed the test,
set forth in a prior holding, 252 that a party complaining about peremptory
challenges must show only that the trial was materially unfair. 253 Further,
the supreme court stated that the entire trial record must be examined in
order to decide whether an error in awarding strikes resulted in a materially
unfair trial. 254 In particular, such an examination is necessary to determine
if the trial was hotly contested and the evidence was sharply conflicting. 255
In Lopez the court found that the parties hotly contested the trial and that
the evidence conflicted sharply. 256 In addition the court noted that two defendants who had been awarded extra peremptory challenges had repeatedly
used their ostensibly antagonistic positions unfairly by one defendant calling
a witness to establish a few routine facts and then quickly turning the witness over to the co-defendant for "cross-examination" by leading questions. 257 The court also noted that the defendants had collaborated on the
exercise of their strikes, and did not have any double strikes when the jury
was selected. 2 8 Not surprisingly, the court concluded that reversible error
was present.

259

Finally, in Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick260 the supreme court noted the
distinction between the rule for preservation of error on a challenge for cause
as opposed to the rule for a peremptory challenge. Generally, when a challenge for cause is overruled, the challenging party, in order to preserve error,
is required to identify an unacceptable juror that he was forced to accept
because of the ruling. 261 In Scurlock the supreme court reiterated that that
rule was not applicable when the trial court improperly apportioned peremptory challenges.

262

B. Jury Argument
Ford Motor Co. v. Durril 263 examined the propriety of the use of a videotape during closing argument. Durrill involved a wrongful death action
brought against an automobile manufacturer by the parents of a victim who
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

709 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. 1986).
Patterson Dental Co. v. Dunn, 592 S.W.2d 914, 921 (Tex. 1979).
Lopez, 709 S.W.2d at 644.
Id.
Id.

256. Id. at 645.
257. Id.

258. Id.
259. Id.
260. 724 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1986).
261. Id. at 5.

262. Id.
263. 714 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).

1987]

TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE

sustained fatal burn injuries from a fuel tank explosion in her car. During
the trial the plaintiff sought to introduce a videotape showing rear-end collisions and fires that immediately followed. In footage of one collision and fire
the tape showed lifelike dummies being enveloped in flames. Although the
tape was not admitted for general purposes during the trial, the district court
did allow the film to be introduced to show the size and magnitude of fuelfed fires. During closing argument, the videotape was shown to the jury, and
the plaintiff's attorney prefaced the showing by remarking that the defendant automobile manufacturer knew as early as 1967 what would happen
when cars leaked fuel, as evidenced by the videotape. Although the appellate court found that the use of the videotape and the remarks made during
closing arguments were improper, the court concluded that the error was
not so grave as to constitute reversible error, particularly in light of the failure of the defendant's counsel to object to the use of the tape during
264
argument.
C. Jury Misconduct
As noted in a prior survey, 265 the enactment of Texas Rule of Evidence
606(b) 266 may have a significant impact on claims of jury misconduct. In
general, the rule provides that a juror may not testify as to any matter or
statement occurring during the course of a jury's deliberations, except that a
juror may testify as to whether any outside influence was improperly
26 8
brought to bear upon a juror. 267 In Daniels v. Melton Truck Lines, Inc.
the plaintiffs claimed that a take-nothing judgment entered against them was
the result of one of the jurors using her position as a police officer to influence and intimidate other members of the jury. The plaintiffs offered affidavits to that effect from other jurors. The court of appeals held that evidence
regarding statements made by the police officer-juror was not an outside influence and, accordingly, was not admissible under rule 606(b). 2 6 9 Thus, the
court concluded that there were no grounds for reversal based on juror
270
misconduct.
Similar holdings were made in Robinson Electric Supply Co. v. Cadillac
Cable Corp.27 1 and Baker Marine Corp. v. Weatherby Engineering Co. 272 In
the Robinson Electric case the appellant claimed that an additional sum was
added to the plaintiff's award as interest because of a suggestion by one juror. The court held that such a claim was insufficient to establish the existence of an outside influence as required under rule 606(b), and thus, did not
264. Id. at 341-42.
265. See Figari, Graves & Dwyer, Texas Civil Procedure,Annual Survey of Texas Law, 39
Sw. L.J. 419, 453 (1985).
266. TEX. R. EvID. 606(b).
267. Id.
268. 704 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
269. Id. at 145.
270. Id.
271. 706 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
272. 710 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
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constitute grounds for reversal. 273 Similarly, in the Baker Marine case the
court held that a juror's testimony was inadmissible on an issue of jury misconduct. 274 The excluded testimony was to the effect that another juror
seemed to be prejudiced against the defendant throughout the deliberations
and seemed to have already made up her mind about the case before jury
of outside influence is
discussions. 275 The court ruled that only evidence
276
misconduct.
jury
of
issue
the
on
admissible
D. Right to a Jury Trial
During the Survey period two notable cases discussed the right to a jury
trial. The court of appeals in Gordon v. Gordon 277 held that even if a party
waives a jury at one trial, that waiver does not affect either party's right to
demand a jury for a second trial resulting from a reversal and remand on
278
appeal of the first trial.

In Fleet v. Fleet279 the supreme court discussed the legal principles applicable to the ability of a trial judge to render a judgment based on an incomplete verdict. In Fleet the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had
committed various breaches of fiduciary duties as an independent executor.
The trial court presented the acts claimed to be breaches in one jury issue.
The questions in the jury issue were lettered "A" through "K" with each
lettered question referring to a different act. The jury found in the affirmative with respect to some questions, in the negative with respect to other
questions, and left the remaining questions unanswered. In an additional
issue related to a statute of limitations defense, the jury answered some of
the questions and found that the plaintiff had discovered the existence of
some of the acts outside the limitations period. The jury, however, did not
answer the questions concerning when the plaintiff discovered the existence
of the other acts. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the defendant on the basis of the incomplete verdict. 28 0 Apparently, the court reasoned
that all of the acts found to be breaches of fiduciary duties were also found to
have been discovered by the plaintiff at a point in time sufficient to support
the limitations defense. On appeal, the supreme court observed that a judgment cannot be based on a verdict containing unanswered issues that are
281
supported by some evidence unless the unanswered issues are immaterial.
A court should consider an issue to be immaterial only if the answer to the
issue can be found elsewhere in the charge or if the answer to the issue can273.
outside
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

706 S.W.2d at 132; see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 327(b) (juror may testify concerning only
influences).
710 S.W.2d at 693.
Id. at 692.
Id. at 693.
704 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ dism'd).
Id. at 492.
711 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam).

280. Id. at 2.
281. Id. at 2-3 (citing Powers v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 144 Tex. 415, 418, 191 S.W.2d
7, 9 (1945)).
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not change the effect of the verdict. 282 In Fleet the supreme court concluded
that the issues the jury left unanswered were material. 283 Each issue inquired about a different act of the independent executor, and therefore, while
the jury found in the answered issues that the plaintiff discovered acts at a
time outside of the statute of limitations, the jury may have found that the
plaintiff discovered the acts about which the jury did not answer within the
applicable time period under the statute of limitations. 28 4 Accordingly, the
court held that the issues left unanswered were material, and the case was
28 5
remanded for a new trial.
XII.

DISMISSALS AND MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL

In Shamrock Roofing Supply, Inc. v. Mercantile National Bank 286 the
court discussed the duty of a movant to present for hearing a motion for new
trial. After the entry of a default judgment the losing party filed a motion
for new trial but failed to request a hearing, and the motion was later overruled by operation of law. 28 7 On the day after the motion had been overruled by operation of law, the movant brought the motion for new trial to
the trial judge's attention by filing a motion for a hearing on the motion for
new trial. Although recognizing that "presentment" of a motion for new
trial is no longer required by the rules and that, ordinarily, a point in a
motion for new trial may be considered on an appeal when the motion has
been overruled by operation of law, the court of appeals nonetheless held
that the motion in this case should have been brought to the trial court's
attention before it was overruled by operation of law. 28 8 According to the
court, when a motion for new trial requires the exercise of discretion, the
trial judge must have an opportunity to exercise that discretion before the
court of appeals will hold that the discretion has been abused. 2 89
The general rule with respect to nonsuits is that a defendant will be barred
from prosecuting a counterclaim if it is not filed before a plaintiff's motion
for nonsuit is filed, even if the counterclaim is filed before the nonsuit is
actually granted. 290 In Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Kyles 29 1 the court recognized that an exception to this general rule exists in workers' compensation cases. The court referred to article 8307d, which provides that a
plaintiff may take a nonsuit after notice to the other parties to the suit and a
282. 711 S.W.2d at 2.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 2-3.
286. 703 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
287. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(c). Rule 329b(c) provides that a motion for new trial will be
considered overruled by operation of law if not determined by written order within seventy-five
days after the court signs the judgment. id.
288. 703 S.W.2d at 358.
289. Id.
290. Greenberg v. Brookshire, 640 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1982); see 4 R. McDONALD, TEXAS
CIVIL PRACTICE § 17.16.3 (rev. 1984).

291. 704 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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hearing. 292 All parties must perfect their cause of action by the time of the
hearing. 293 In Kyles no evidence existed to show that the trial court held a
hearing, as required by article 8307d, prior to granting a nonsuit in favor of
the plaintiff. Accordingly, the court held that the defendant was entitled to
proceed on a counterclaim that had been filed before the nonsuit was
294
granted.
In Guaranty County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Reyna 295 the plaintiff
brought a claim under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act 296 against two defendants. When one of the defendants failed to appear the plaintiff nonsuited the remaining defendant and took a default judgment against the
defendant who did not appear. The trial court thereafter denied a motion
for new trial to set aside the default judgment. On appeal, the supreme court
held that because the defaulting defendant had failed to prove sufficient
grounds to set aside the default, the trial court did not commit reversible
error in refusing to set aside the default judgment. 29 7 The supreme court,
however, expressly disapproved of the court of appeals' holding that the
granting of the defendant's motion for new trial would prejudice the plaintiff
because of the nonsuit taken against the other defendant. 298 The supreme
court noted that the plaintiff's injury was caused by the plaintiff's own action in nonsuiting the other defendant and that the self-imposed nonsuit
alone was not a sufficient ground for setting aside the default judgment. 299

292. TEx.

REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307d (Vernon Supp. 1985).
293. Id.
294. 704 S.W.2d at 477.

295. 709 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam).
296.
297.
298.
299.

TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.041-.063 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
709 S.W.2d at 648.
Id
Id.

